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BANK BRANCHES AND RURAL DEPOSITS: 
EVIDENCE FROM BANGLADESH 
by 
Richard L. Meyer 
M.A. Baqui Khalily 
Leroy J. Hushak 
Introduction 
Three reasons explain the increasing attention given to rural deposit mobilization in 
developing countries. First, these countries must improve aggregate savings rates in order 
to substitute for reduced inflows of foreign savings. The rural sector looms large in these 
economies and must furnish much of these savings. Research has shown that marginal 
propensities to save are higher in rural than in urban areas (Alamgir; Williamson). Second, 
rural households benefit from secure places to hold financial assets (Adams; Vogel). 
Further, the average rate of return to investment can rise through increased financial 
intermediation (Fry). Third, the viability of rural financial institutions is linked to increased 
deposit mobilization (Meyer). 
Many factors are expected to influence deposits in rural financial institutions. Wai's 
framework of ability, willingness, and opportunity to demand deposits has inspired much 
research. Opportunity is an important factor, over which policymakers have some control, 
and it deserves analysis for two reasons. First, availability of deposit services, measured by 
the density of deposit-taking institutions, is an important determinant of rural deposits 
(Srinivasan and Meyer, 1968). Policymakers influence banking density through licensing and 
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other regulations. Second, policy emphasis on rural loans has prompted the expansion of 
lending facilities into rural areas. Some institutions, such as the specialized agricultural 
development banks, have often been denied the opportunity to use their branch network to 
accept deposits, while in other cases deposit taking has simply not been aggressively pursued, 
because of funds easily available from the central bank and/ or donors. 
The rural deposit mobilization experience in Bangladesh is particularly interesting. 
For several years policies were employed to expand agricultural lending and, along with it, 
the bank branching network into the rural areas. The impact on rural deposits has been sig-
nificant, because transaction costs for depositors have been thereby reduced. Smaller-size 
bank deposits become more attractive for households when transaction costs fall. Full-
service rural branches are expensive to operate, however, even with the labor intensive 
technology employed in Bangladesh. There are suggestions that the rapid rural branch 
expansion had a negative impact on bank operations (World Bank). 
As banks responded to the country's desire to expand rural lending, the distribution 
of branches can be expected to have been influenced by the volume of loans made at each 
branch. By providing both loan and deposit services, branches may be able to capitalize on 
economies of scale and of scope. Interestingly, when two nationalized commercial banks 
(NCBs) were privatized, they dropped out of the special agricultural credit programs and 
transferred some of their rural branches to other banks. It may not be profitable to operate 
rural branches solely for deposit mobilization purposes. 
The purpose of this chapter is to document the deposit mobilization experience of 
Bangladesh and to test the relationship between deposits and branches. Most research has 
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assumed that increased bank density stimulates households to deposit by reducing their 
transaction costs. This chapter tests the simultaneous relation between bank branching and 
the volume of deposits. Increased branch density stimulates deposits, while the deposit 
potential affects the number and location of branches. 
Financial Institutions and Policies in Bangladesh 
The Bangladesh financial system is in its early stages of development. After 
independence, all domestic banks and insurance companies were nationalized in 1972. Six 
new commercial banks and two insurance corporations were created. Foreign banks were 
allowed to operate under restricted conditions. By 1981, there were 16 banks, seven of them 
foreign. During 1983-84, 8 private banks were chartered, including 2 denationalized 
commercial banks. Most banks concentrate their operations in urban areas. Rural deposit 
mobilization is undertaken mostly by the NCBs and the specialized agricultural development 
bank (Bangladesh Krishi Bank - BKB). Rural deposits in cooperatives and the postal 
savings system are insignificant by comparison. 
Government control over the nationalized banks is pervasive, and regulation of the 
entire system strong. The Bangladesh Bank (central bank) formulates policies under the 
strong direction of the Ministry of Finance. This intervention affects bank performance and 
viability. Three major policies--interest rate regulation, branch licensing, and refinancing--
directly influence rural deposit mobilization. 
Interest rates on both deposits and loans are regulated by the Bangladesh Bank. The 
deposit rate structure was significantly revised in 1974, 1976, and especially in 1980 (Table 
4 
1 ). In the 1980s, interest rates on some classes of deposits in rural branches have been set 
one or two percentage points above those in urban branches to stimulate rural deposits. 
Changes in deposit rates have not kept pace with inflation. The real weighted rate paid on 
interest-bearing deposits was negative from 1976 through 1984, except in these three years. 
Rural branching policy has been pursued mostly with the objective of supplying cheap 
credit to farmers. Historically, two factors were considered in granting licenses for new 
bank branches: deposit potential, as a function of income, and degree of local competitive-
ness. This policy created insufficient demand for rural licenses, so a "two-for-one" policy was 
introduced in 1977-78, whereby a bank was required to open two rural branches for each 
new urban branch authorized. During 1977-81, the number of rural branches almost 
doubled, from 857 to 1,527. This expansion slowed, following the suspension of the policy 
in 1981. 
The availability of cheap rediscount funds for agricultural loans may be a disincentive 
for banks to mobilize deposits, but there is little empirical research that actually tests for 
this negative causality (Meyer and Esguerra). The NCBs and especially BKB have been 
supplied with relatively abundant rediscount funds for their agricultural lending. Prior to 
1983, refinancing facilities varied between 30 and 100 percent of the amount of targeted 
rural loans made by the bank and the interest rate charged was 6 percent, 2 percentage 
points below the bank rate and half the 12 percent charged to borrowers1. This policy was 
1 The bank rate is the rate at which banks can borrow from the Bangladesh Bank for 
liquidity purposes. 
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revised in September, 1983 at the urging of USAID, to reduce bank dependency on 
refinancing and stimulate deposit mobilization. 
The nature of the rural economy presents opportunities and challenges for developing 
cost-effective rural financial services. On the one hand, in a densely populated country like 
Bangladesh2, there appears to be good potential for developing a dense banking network 
in the rural areas, to bring bank branches close to most rural residents. On the other hand, 
the market for deposit services is limited. Incomes are low (per capita income of about 
$150), most farm and nonfarm enterprises operate at a low volume, many transactions are 
not monetized, rickshaws are the cheapest source of transportation, so travel distances are 
usually short, and travel is particuiarly difficult in the wet season, when much of the land 
is flooded. Transaction costs for many rural depositors with small accounts are likely to be 
high, in spite of whatever internal efficiencies a branch can achieve. 
The loan market is also constrained. Many potential borrowers are not creditworthy. 
They have low and variable incomes, and have few reserves for times of adversity. Low-
lying areas are subject to severe flooding, which periodically wipes out the few reserves held 
by farm households. Government relief and agricultural programs do not alleviate these 
conditions. Unless the banking system is provided with strong incentives, it is not likely to 
make many farm loans. 
2 Approximately 100 million people in an area about the size of Wisconsin. 
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Patterns and Trends in Bank Deposits 
The patterns and trends in total and rural bank deposits are discussed in this 
section3• 
For the period 1975-84, total bank deposits, in real terms, experienced an annual 
average growth exceeding 13 percent (Table 2). Interest-bearing deposits increased twice 
as rapidly as non-interest bearing deposits indicating a considerable response to interest rate 
changes. This is also reflected in the growth rates of saving and term deposits. Saving 
deposits grew at an annual rate of 9.2 percent, while term deposits of different maturity 
period grew at an annual rate of over 20 percent during the period 1975-84. Note that 
higher interest rates are offered on term deposits. The share of personal rather than group 
or corporate deposits increased from 29 percent of the total in 1975 to over 45 percent in 
1984. Rural deposits contributed to this growing share of personal deposits. Historically, 
most deposits were held by the NCBs, because of their widespread network and their 
prominance in the sector. Their share significantly decreased, however, from 90 to 71 
percent during the 1973-84 period, partly due to increased bank privatization. 
During 1976-84, in real terms, rural deposits grew about twenty three percent and 
their share increased from 9 to over 17 percent of total deposits (Table 3)4• The "two-for-
3 Deposit data used in analyzing the patterns and trends were obtained from quarterly 
reports submitted to the Bangladesh Bank by each rural branch. Data were corrected 
for errors in computer data entry, late submission of reports by some branches, and 
other quality control problems. In addition, deposits in cooperative and private 
banks are excluded. Rural deposits are those held in branches defined as "rural" by 
the Bangladesh Bank. 
4 The Consumer Price Index published in the IMF International Financial Statistics 
was used in the absence of a complete series for the rural areas. 
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one" branching policy resulted in a relatively rapid expansion of rural branches. In 1976, 
less than one-half of the total number of branches were rural. l3y 1984, about two-thirds of 
the total branches were rural. Average deposits per rural branch, in real terms, grew at an 
average annual rate of about 4 percent. During much of the 1976-84 period, growth in real 
deposits kept pace with growth in the number of branches. Urban deposits, during the same 
period, grew at an average annual rate of about 12 percent, higher than the urban branch 
growth rate. Though the urban deposit growth rate is lower than the rural deposit growth 
rate, average urban branch deposits per branch were about ten times the average rural 
branch level. Since the number of urban branches increased more slowly than that of rural 
. 
branches, the growth in urban d~posits per branch was somewhat greater. This result 
implies that branch expansion contributed somewhat less to urban deposit growth. 
The four major NCBs (Agrani, Janata, Rupali, and Sonali) and BKB had most of the 
rural bank branches (84 percent in 1984) and mobilized 91 percent of total rural deposits. 
These data reflect rapid deposit expansion in 1983-84 (Table 4). While non-interest bearing 
deposits constitute about 20 percent of total rural deposits, a proportion similar to that 
found in urban branches, interest-bearing deposits grew faster in this period. Total rural 
deposits, in real terms, increased by 29 percent, while term deposits increased by about 45 
percent. This change in deposit composition suggests that rural depositors treat a large 
portion of deposits as forms of holding wealth responsive to interest rates. An analysis of 
deposit growth by interest rates and classes showed that deposit categories with earnings of 
12 percent and above experienced the most rapid growth. This is an indication of the 
interest elasticity of the demand for deposits. 
8 
Rural branches provide services to local business and government units as well as 
households. Over 80 percent of the deposits seem to have originated from the private sector 
(Table 5). Personal and service deposits constituted about three-fifths, while public-sector 
deposits accounted for about 16 percent of the total. It appears, therefore, that a significant 
amount of rural bank deposits come from households. 
Unfortunately, the characteristics of personal depositors are unknown and the 
amounts deposited by farm households or by low-income groups cannot be identified. Some 
inferences can be obtained, however, by analyzing the size distribution of the accounts 
(Table 6). The rural branches of these five banks had about 4 million accounts in 1983 and 
almost 5 million in 1984. About 95 percent of these accounts were of less than 5,000 taka 
and represented about half of the total volume of rural deposits. Low and medium income 
households thus seem to make significant use of these financial instruments. Furthermore, 
the growth rate of the amount and number of small-sized accounts was greater than for 
many of the large-size categories. 
The econometric analysis reported in the next section used district level data5• The 
volume and growth in deposits varied widely across districts (Table 7). Deposits grew less 
rapidly in the three most commercially developed districts of Chittagong, Dhaka and Sylhet 
than in many less developed districts. Banking and monetization of the economy expanded 
more quickly in the hinterland than in regions already more developed. 
5 Districts are intermediate administrative units between division and Upa-zilla. 
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Determinants of Deposit Behavior 
This section reports on the empirical results of a model tested to explain voluntary 
rural savings deposits in five banks. The model was specified to capture the behavior of 
households. A subset of district-level interest-bearing deposits was obtained for the five 
banks from the Bangladesh Bank Data Tape in order to test the model. 
Earlier studies of demand for rural deposits used single-equation models, based on 
the implicit assumption of independence of supply of and demand for deposit services. This 
approach failed to recognize, however, that the number and distribution of deposit-taking 
institutions is influenced in part by deposit potential. Although the primary objective of the 
banks during much of this period may have been to obtain urban branch licenses, the 
decision to seek a license for a rural branch in a particular location may have been 
determined by the possibility of tapping deposit potential, either because no branch existed 
in that market area or because the deposit potential is still great relative to the number of 
existing branches. Competition among branches should expand aggregate deposits. A 
simultaneous equation model was developed therefore, to explain deposits and bank 
branches at the district level. 
Five major factors are found in the literature on deposit determination functions--
income, interest rates, access to banking facilities, transaction costs, and yields on competing 
non-financial assets. Some important but difficult to measure factors, such as the quality 
of services provided to depositors, awareness of banking services, and perceptions about the 
safety of deposits have been largely ignored in empirical research. 
10 
Income is expected to have a positive effect on deposits. Because of the variability 
of rural income, the permanent-income hypothesis may better explain the influence of 
income. Households use financial savings to even out consumption expenditures under 
variable income situations. The elasticity of deposits with respect to transitory income is, 
therefore, expected to be higher than the elasticity with respect to permanent income. 
Although the empirical validity of the permanent-income hypothesis for savings is well 
established (Canh; Friend and Taubman; Williamson), data limitations have forced deposit 
mobilization studies to utilize absolute income (Srinivasan and Meyer, 1986; Vasquez). 
A widely debated issue in rural finance has been the relationship between interest 
rates and financial savings. McKinnon and Shaw argued that low real interest rates 
contribute to inefficient investment decisions and a limited mobilization of household 
savings. Research suggests that low nominal interest rates coupled with high inflation rates 
discourage deposits, while positive real interest rates stimulate them (Fry; Lanyi and 
Saracoglu; Srinivasan and Meyer, 1986; Vasquez). Wai argued, however, that in developing 
countries financial savings may not necessarily be responsive to interest rates, when such 
rates are below equilibrium levels, and because depositors may be insensitive to too small 
changes in rates. Some studies have indeed shown a weak relationship between interest 
rates and deposits (Iqbal; Tanchoco-Subido). 
Burkett and Vogel, as well as Ortmeyer underscored the significant role of 
transaction costs in the portfolio decisions of households. The transaction costs of making 
and withdrawing deposits reduce the net returns earned. Most of the literature, however, 
considers only the impact of borrower and lender transaction costs on credit rationing 
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(Ahmed; Gonzalez-Vega), and few studies directly test for the effects of depositor trans-
action costs (Guerrero). 
Most studies rely on indirect estimates of transaction cost effects (Burkett and Vogel; 
Srinivasan and Meyer, 1986). Depositor transaction costs can be proxied by the number of 
banking facilities and the availability of roads and vehicles. Several studies have found a 
positive and significant relationship between demand for deposits and expansion of bank 
branches (Rana; Srinivasan and Meyer, 1986; Vasquez; Wai). 
The demand for deposits may be influenced by education which, among other effects, 
may increase the awareness of rural agents about banking services (Mauri; Von Pischke), 
but literacy or awareness are among the least emphasized factors in rural deposit studies. 
The limited empirical evidence available is inconclusive; Vasquez found a negative elasticity 
of bank deposits with respect to education in the Dominican Republic as more educated 
agents held more sophisticated assets, while Koropecky found a positive relationship in 
Bangladesh. In general, it may be expected that as rural agents become more knowledge-
able about banking services, either because of education or the effect of having a nearby 
branch, they will develop confidence in banking institutions, leading to increased demand 
for deposits. 
The factors that explain rural bank branching are less well understood. No study has 
been found which explicitly accounted for the impact of deposits on the number and location 
of deposit-taking facilities in developing countries. Yet, it should be expected that the 
decisions to expand such facilities depend on deposit potential, regional income, the local 
level of competition, and the transportation and communications facilities available. The 
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supply-leading approach to rural finance suggests that the volume of rural loans contributes 
positively to the expansion of banking facilities (Patrick; Rana), but no study has been found 
that empirically tested for this relationship. 
The limited empirical evidence available on bank branching suggests that the level 
of competition and deposit potential influence the location of bank branches (Doyle et al.; 
Spong and Hoenig). In the Bangladesh case, the central bank considers deposit potential 
and the level of competition when evaluating requests for licenses to open new branches. 
Banks evaluate, as well, several factors influencing branch viability such as permanent 
income in the region, actual or potential volume of loans, the availability of transportation, 
and the volume of deposits generated by other banks. Doyle et al. used the number of retail 
shops as an indicator of deposit potential. One policy objective in Bangladesh was to 
expand rural branches as a way to expand rural lending. Thus, it is expected that the 
greater the volume of rural loans, the larger the branch network. Inflation adversely affects 
bank expansion because of its negative impact on the demand for deposits. On the other 
hand, improvements in rural transportation should encourage banks to expand their facilities 
in the rural areas. 
Empirical Model 
A two-way causality between deposits and bank branches implies a simultaneous 
equations model. A power function based on a Cobb-Douglas specification was selected. 
To account for differences in district size, a per capita specification of the variables was 
13 
used. As in earlier studies, linearity was imposed and the model was expressed in the log-
log form as follows: 
where, 
ln(DINT/POP) =A+ a1lnPYP + a2 lnPYT + a3 lnBF + a4 lnRDV + 
lnBF = B + P1 lnPYP + P2 lnRDV + P3 lnP + P4 lnPCR + 
p 1"( DINT) + U. 
5\POP 2 
DINT /POP = District per capita volume of interest-bearing deposits; 
PYP = District per capita permanent income; 
PYT = District per capita transitory income; 
BF = Number of district rural bank branches 
per capita; 
RDV = District per capita index of roads and vehicles; 
L = District literacy rate; 
P = District rural inflation; 
PCR = District per capita volume of rural loans 
outstanding; 
(1) 
(2) 
Equation (1) represents the demand for deposits while equation (2) represents the 
supply of deposit services through an expansion of bank branches. The conceptual 
discussion above which yields equations (1) and (2) excludes PCR from equation (1) and 
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L and PYT from equation (2) which satisfies the order conditions. Two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) were used to estimate the parameters of the structural equations. The F-ratio was 
used to estimate the validity of the model and the conventional t-test was used for the 
significance of the estimated parameters. 
The model was fitted to pooled data for 20 districts for 1983 and 1984. Data on 
deposits, number of bank branches, and volume of rural loans outstanding were obtained 
from the Bangladesh Bank Data Tape. Data on literacy rates, inflation rates, income, and 
roads and vehicles were obtained from the Statistical Year Book. 1985, and District 
Statistics. 1983. 
Data on district agricultural GDP for the 1976-84 period were used as a proxy for 
district rural income and to estimate permanent and transitory income in a trend equation. 
Trend values were considered permanent income, while the residuals were treated as 
transitory income. Literacy was used as a proxy for awareness of banking, and was defined 
as the percentage of persons 5 years of age or above who can read and write. Since 
nominal interest rates offered by banks are the same across districts, differences in real 
interest rates were captured through district inflation rates measured by changes in the cost 
of living index. Data on rural inflation were available only for six regions representing the 
four administrative divisions. Because of the small geographical size of divisions, these 
inflation data were used to represent all twenty districts. 
The district roads and vehicles index was measured as: 
15 
RDV = 1 1 x 100 ( RD./ TA.) 
J POPJ I TVj 
where, 
RDVj = Weighted index of roads and vehicles in jth 
district; 
RDj = Mileage of roads in jth district; 
TAi = Total geographical area of jth district; 
POPj = Size of population in thousands of j1h district. 
TVj = Total number of vehicles in .i1h district. Vehicles were defined to include 
buses, cars, and rickshaws. 
Districts with a large number of vehicles and mileage of roads per 1,000 people have a high 
index. 
Analysis of Empirical Results 
The empirical results are presented in Tables 8 and 9. The second-stage statistics 
report the direct effects of the explanatory variables on deposits (Table 8) and on bank 
branches (Table 9). The reduced-form coefficients show the total effects (direct and 
indirect) of the variables on deposits and on bank branches. The coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
All structural coefficients for the deposit equation had the expected signs and, except 
for the inflation rate and permanent income, were statistically significant. The model 
16 
explained about 69 percent of the variance in interest bearing deposits. The bank branch 
equation, significant at the 0.0001 level, explained about 80 percent of the variance. Except 
for roads and vehicles, all structural variables in the bank branch equation were statistically 
significant. 
The significant cross coefficients for the bank branch and interest-bearing deposits 
variables in the structural equations support the hypothesis of a two-way casualty between 
deposits and bank branches. The elasticity of interest-bearing deposits with respect to bank 
branches, estimated at 0.985, was significant at the 0.10 level, and the elasticity of bank 
branches with respect to interest-bearing deposits, estimated at 0.158, was significant at the 
0.10 level. 
Measures of both absolute and permanent income were used in the test. No 
statistically significant direct effect was found between deposits and permanent and absolute 
income, but both variables were significant in the reduced-form deposit equation. Transitory 
income was significant in both deposit equations. These results imply that the permanent 
income hypothesis explains better the influence of income than does absolute income. 
Neither permanent income nor inflation were significant in the structural equation 
for deposits, but both were significant in the bank branch equations, implying that they 
influence the decision to expand banking facilities. High inflation rates reduce the real 
value of nominal deposits and discourage branch expansion. Because of the relationship 
between permanent income, inflation, bank branch expansion and deposits, it can be 
inferred that permanent income and inflation influence deposits indirectly through bank 
branches. 
. . 
. 
. . 
17 
The roads and vehicles index had a direct effect on deposits, but not on the 
expansion of bank branches. The reduced-form coefficients for roads and vehicles were 
statistically significant in both the deposit and bank branch equations. This implies that 
roads and vehicles influence bank branching indirectly through their effects on deposits, 
perhaps because branch transaction are more dependent on population and average deposit 
size than on the direct effect of roads and vehicles. 
Income, roads and vehicles, inflation, and literacy were all significant in the deposit 
equation. Zero-coefficients were assumed for the volume of outstanding rural credit in the 
deposit equation6, and for the literacy and transitory income variables in the bank branch 
equation. The reduced form coefficients show the validity of these assumptions. The 
volume of rural loans outstanding had a positive effect on the expansion of banking facili-
ties, although the coefficient was relatively small. The coefficients for the other two 
variables were significant. 
The elasticity of deposits with respect to the explanatory variables suggest that 
transaction costs, proxied by the expansion of bank branches and roads and vehicles, have 
an important impact on the demand for deposits. Transaction costs and transitory income 
are the two major factors explaining interest-bearing deposits. The expansion of bank 
branches is largely explained, apart from deposits, by permanent income and inflation. 
6 This approach does not damage the argument that deposits are made because of an 
expectation of getting a loan in the future. 
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Implications for Rural Deposit Mobilization 
There are important reasons for placing greater emphasis on deposit mobilization in 
the promotion of rural financial markets in the developing countries. In spite of low rural 
income, Bangladesh has made important strides in this respect. The most important single 
source of rural deposit growth has been the expansion of the bank branch network. 
Government policies, including the two-for-one policy of branch licensing, influenced this 
process, but the actual number and location of branches have been motivated by the 
economic factors discussed. 
An expansion of the banking network reduces transaction costs for depositors. 
Smaller-size deposits become more attractive for households. Bank branches are expensive 
to operate, on the other hand, although the capital invested in them is extremely low in 
Bangladesh. There have been suggestions that the rapid expansion of the bank network has 
had a negative impact on bank operations because banks have been encouraged to expand 
their branching network without regard to branch viability (World Bank). From the bank's 
perspective, the distribution of branches is affected by the volume of rural loans to be made, 
in addition to the deposits mobilized. By providing both loan and deposit services in the 
rural branches, banks may be able to capitalize on economies of scope. It is interesting to 
note that when two of the NCBs were privatized and no longer participated in agricultural 
credit programs, they transferred some of their branches to the remaining banks. 1bis may 
imply that they believed that it would not be cost effective to mobilize deposits in rural 
branches if they were not also making loans. Thus, the supply-leading agricultural credit 
. . 
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policy followed by the country may have been an important complementary incentive for 
rural branch expansion. 
Interest rate policy is important in determining the spread that banks earn in rural 
operations. A low ceiling on lending rates implies low rates paid to depositors. The 
transaction costs of depositors are likely to be more important than interest rates, on the 
other hand, in influencing deposits at low levels of economic development. Opening 
branches where none previously existed will likely attract many deposits because of the 
decline in transaction costs for households and firms. Once this initial level of deposits has 
been mobilized by the banks, subsequent increases will depend on factors other than 
transaction costs, unless additional reductions in depositor transaction costs can be achieved 
through streamlined bank practices. Bankers and decision makers in Bangladesh have paid 
little attention to these factors. This may explain why growth in real deposits per branch 
has been modest. It is likely that the easy part of deposit mobilization has been completed 
in Bangladesh through branch expansion. What remains to be done is to pay more attention 
to customer service, more aggressive marketing, and the development of financial 
instruments especially attractive to rural households. 
The Bangladesh case reflects the challenge that many countries face in providing 
cost-effective rural financial services. This challenge springs from the nature of the rural 
economy. The structure of the financial system and the technology used in producing 
financial services must be consistent with the rural environment. Bank branches must be 
small, and must utilize labor-intensive technology to handle many small savings and loan 
accounts. To reduce costs, the expenses of operating a branch must be spread over as large 
. . 
. 
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a volume of transactions as possible. It becomes critical that each branch serve both farm 
and non-farm households, with both deposit and loan services. There may be other 
opportunities to provide additional financial services, such as life insurance. This 
environment also implies that decision making must be decentralized and bank managers 
must respond to local situations. Because of the difficulty of transporting cash among 
branches, each branch must try to mobilize and allocate as much as possible of its own 
funds. Efficient interbranch transfer mechanisms are required, however, to help branches 
cope with seasonal surpluses and deficits and to take fuller advantage of financial 
intermediation. Banks will need to go "where the money is." This may require door-to-door 
deposit collection and mobile banks serving local market days. 
A branch banking system offers some advantages over unit banks. The cost of 
designing products and services can be spread over a potentially larger volume. The 
possibility of intrabank transfers of funds can ease the management of liquidity for 
individual branches, by facilitating the transfer of temporary surpluses, while borrowing from 
other branches in deficit periods. The risk of a concentrated loan portfolio of one branch 
in one geographic area can be balanced by the lending of other branches in other areas. 
The branching system has disadvantages, as well. Employee compensation levels may be 
higher and more rigid than in unit banks. If staff are recruited nationally as in Bangladesh, 
their chief objective may be to get transferred as quickly as possible from a rural branch to 
a major urban center. A human capital problem can develop, since those staff that continue 
in branches for the largest time may be the least innovative and those least likely to be 
granted much autonomy. 
.. 
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The high transaction costs of banking can be reduced by a dense banking network 
that locates branches in close proximity to rural residents. The challenge of reducing 
depositor and borrower transaction costs is greater in more sparsely settled regions, where 
it is difficult to achieve economies of scale in banking. The social benefits may be high 
through improved resource allocation via financial intermediation. If some of these benefits 
cannot be captured by the financial institutions because the total volume and average size 
of transactions is low, there may be an opportunity to subsidize the financial institution for 
some of the costs of expanding the financial network. Using subsidies in this form may be 
more efficient and less distorting than trying to channel them directly to households through 
subsidized loans, the strategy followed by many developing countries in the past two 
decades. 
. . . 
• . 
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Table 1 
Interest Rate Structure of Rural Bank Deposits, 1971 to Present 
Type of Deposit Dec 1971 July 11974 April 1, 1976 May 1, 1977 Oct. 16, 1980 Dec. 2, 1982 Jan. 1, 1985 
to to to to to to to 
June 1974 March 31, 1976 April 30, 1977 Oct. 15, 1980 Dec. 1, 1982 Dec. 31, 1984 Present 
Call Deposits none none none none 4Yi none none 
Special account 3 - 3 Y4 4 - 4 Y4 5 - 5 Y4 4 - 4 Y4 4 Yi 4 Yi 4 Y2 
Savings with checking 4.00 5.00 6.00 6.00a 8 Yi 8 Yib 10 Yi 
Savings without checking 4 Yi 6.00 7.00 7 3/4 10.00 10.00 11.00 
Term Deposits: 
1) 3 months and over, 4 Yi 6.00 7.00 8 Yi 12.00 12.00 12.00 
less than 1 year 
2) 6 months and over, 4 3/4 6 Yi 7 Yi 9.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 N 
less than 1 year N 
3) 1 year and over, less 5.00 7 Y4 8 Y4 9 Y4 14.00 14.00 14.00 
than 2 
4) 2 years and over, less 5 Yi 8 Y4 9 Y4 9 Y4 14 Yi 14 Yi 14 Yi 
than 3 
5) For 3 years and over 6.00 9 Y4 10 Y4 10 Y4 15.00 15.00 15.00 
a Reduced to 4 Y2 percent in effect from August 1, 1977. 
b In the rural areas, the rate was 9 Yi percent in effect from July 1, 1984. 
Source: Economic Trends, December, 1985, Bangladesh Bank. 
Table 2 
Total Bank Deposits in Real Term 
By Type of Deposit, 1976-84, Year Ending June 30 
(Base 1976= 100) 
TYPE 
special SA YING DEPOSITS TERM DEPOSITS (months) 
Year Current Call account checking Non- 3-<6 6-<12 12-<24 24-<36 36+ TOTAL 
deposits deposits deposits checking 
(Million Taka) 
1976 3,383 74 2,773 2,410 396 396 234 655 150 1,121 11,594 
1977 3,578 94 3,243 2,630 443 474 248 712 211 1,552 13,187 
1978 3,562 216 3,370 2,851 552 308 333 659 223 1,996 14,072 
1979 4,181 295 3,925 3,212 776 227 505 688 264 2,436 16,510 ~ 
1980 4,703 117 5,210 3,209 863 240 364 656 252 2,680 17,664 
1981 4,286 163 5,078 3,825 1,178 505 522 836 310 3,138 19,829 
1982 4,137 389 4,661 3,488 1,161 686 471 1,133 295 3,472 19,897 
1983 5,156 491 5,260 4,043 1,338 1,116 709 1,859 372 4,083 24,323 
1984 6,064 200 4,737 4,737 1,663 1,596 1,346 2,995 384 5,183 30,552 
Average 
Growth Rate 8.2 27.5 7.8 9.2 20.4 24.6 29.1 23.2 13.5 21.4 13.2 
(Percent) 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Bull~ti11, February, 1985. 
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Table 3 
Total Real Bank Deposits by Rural and Urban Branches, 1976-1984 
Year Ending June 30 
RURAL URBAN 
Year Numer of Total Average Deposits Percent of Total Number of Total Average Deposits 
Branches Deposits per Branch Deposits Branches Deposits per Branch 
(Million Taka) (Million Taka) 
1976 826 1,063 1.28 9.2 922 10,531 11.42 
1977 1,056 1,416 1.34 10.7 1,009 11,771 11.67 
1978 1,634 1,865 1.14 13.3 1,125 12,207 10.85 
1979 2,001 2,549 1.27 15.4 1,247 13,960 11.19 
1980 2,467 3,172 131 173 1,342 15,121 11.28 
1981 2,796 3,151 1.13 16.2 1,493 16,650 11.15 
1982 2,932 3,069 1.05 15.4 1,538 16,828 10.94 
1983 3,050 4,076 1.34 16.8 1,565 20,247 12.94 
1984 3,301 5,213 1.58 17.1 1,684 25,339 16.05 
Average 
Growth Rate 19.8 22.9 3.7 7.9 11.9 3.8 
(Percent) 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Bulletin, February, 1985. 
Scheduled Bank Statistics., 1976-84, Bangladesh Bank. 
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Table 4 
Rural Deposits of Five Banks by Type of Deposit, 1983-84 
Year Ending June 30 
1983 1984 
TYPE Deposit Percent Deposits Percent Growth Rate 
Percent 
(Million Taka) 
Current Deposits 1,588 20.7 2,112 19.0 33.0 
Call Deposits 67 0.9 70 0.6 4.9 
Special Account Deposits 624 8.1 920 8.3 47.5 
Savings (Checking) 2,671 34.8 3,715 33.4 39.1 
Deposits 
Savings (Non-checking) 946 12.3 1,405 12.6 48.5 
Deposits 
Fixed Deposits (Term): 
3 - < 6 months 54 0.7 96 0.9 78.3 
6 - < 12 months 67 0.9 156 1.4 132.8 
12 - < 24 months 251 3.3 413 3.7 64.7 
24 - < 36 months 75 1.0 122 1.1 61.9 
36 +months 1,343 17.5 2,113 19.0 57.3 
TOTAL 7,686 100 11,122 100 44.7 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Data Tape 
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Table 5 
Rural Deposits of Five Banks by Category of Depositors, 1983-84, 
Year Ending June 30 
1983 1984 
Category Deposits Percent Deposit Percent Growth Rate 
Percent 
(Million Taka) 
FOREIGN 42 0.5 73 0.7 75.8 
PUBLIC SECTOR: 1,390 16.8 1,745 15.6 25.5 
Government 219 2.8 347 3.1 58.8 
Public enterprises 536 7.0 691 6.2 29.0 
Autonomous, semi-auto 417 5.4 537 4.8 28.9 
and local authorities 
Other 119 1.6 169 1.5 42.5 
PRIVATE SECTOR: 6,354 82.7 9,304 83.6 46.4 
Agri, fishing, etc. 98 1.3 158 1.4 60.0 
Personal and service 4,423 57.5 6,699 60.2 51.4 
Manufacturing, business 574 7.5 735 6.6 28.1 
org. & others 
Others 1,258 16.4 1,712 15.4 36.1 
Total" 7,686 100 11,122 99.9 44.7 
• Totals may not agree because of rounding. 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Data Tape 
Table 6 
Size Distribution of Rural Deposit Accounts of Five Banks, 1983-84 
Year Ending June 30 
Growth Rate 
1983 1984 Percent 
Size of Ac- Deposits Percent Number of Percent Deposits Percent Number of Percent Deposits Number of 
count Accounts Accounts Accounts 
(Thousand) (Million Taka) 
0 - < 5 3097 50.8 3,812,936 95.3 5,375 48.3 4,687,213 94.0 37.6 22.9 
5 - < 10 720 9.4 102,556 2.6 1,093 9.8 156,811 3.2 51.8 52.9 
10-<25 926 12.0 61,042 1.5 1,333 13.8 101,148 2.0 65.6 65.7 
25 - < 50 54 7.1 16,042 0.4 875 7.9 25,8n 0.5 60.6 61.3 
50 - < 100 372 4.8 5,412 0.2 628 5.7 9,3n 0.2 68.8 73.3 N 
-....l 
100 - < 200 310 4.0 2,317 0.1 675 6.1 2,992 0.1 118.0 29.1 
1.5 466 a 152 1.4 635 a 200 - < 300 112 36.5 36.3 
0.9 204 
a 
86 0.8 249 
a 
300 - < 400 69 25.2 22.1 
68 0.9 152 - 53 0.5 118 a 400 - < 500 -21.4 
-22.4 
1.8 212 
a 
232 2.1 339 
a 
500 - < 1000 138 69.2 59.9 
521 6.8 202 
a 
684 6.2 268 a 1000 + 31.3 32.7 
TOTAL 7686 4,001,504 11,122 4,985,027 44.7 24.6 
a Less than 0.1 percent. 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Data Tape 
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Table 7 
Rural Deposits for Five Hanks by District, 1983-84 
Year Ending June 30 
Year 
DISTRICT 1983 1984 Growth Rate Percent 
(Million Taka) 
Chittagong 1,091 1,449 32.8 
Chittagong H.T. 124 184 47.7 
Camilla 589 905 53.7 
Noakhali 368 518 41.0 
Sylhet 913 1,252 37.1 
Dhaka 992 1,407 41.8 
Faridpur 238 341 43.3 
Mymensing 252 326 29.2 
Tangail 194 275 41.5 
Jamalpur 117 158 35.3 
Baris al 251 381 51.8 
Jessore 372 560 50.4 
Khulna 290 532 83.3 
Kushtia 214 208 44.0 
Putuakhali 75 128 71.5 
Bogra 248 359 44.6 
Dinajpur 226 348 71.5 
Pabna 307 443 44.6 
Rajshahi 482 787 63.3 
Rangpur 342 562 64.5 
TOTAL a 7,686 11,122 44.7 
a Totals may not agree because of rounding. 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Data Tape 
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Table 8 
Estimated Parameters of the Double Log Interest Bearing Deposit Function 
Permanent Income Hypothesis Absolute Income Hypothesis 
Reduced Form Second Stage Reduced Form Second Stage 
Parameter Equation Statistics Indirect Equation Statistics 
(Variable) (T-Ratio) (T-Ratio) Effecta (T-Ratio) (T-Ratio) 
Intercept -1.686*** 6.06*** -2.243** 10.992** 
(-.932) (.884) (-1.328) (1.428) 
(PYP) .595* .057 .538 
(3.571) (.083) 
(PYT) 2.783** 2.40** .383 
(1.225) (1.260) 
(L) .216 .185** .031 .286*** .169 
(.595) (.849) (.811) (.758) 
(P) -.104 .058 -.162 .009 .287* 
(-.560) (.230) (.061) (1.760) 
(BF) .985* 1.626** 
(1.785) (1.586) 
(RDV) .278* .219* .059 .263 .167* 
(4.138) (2.333) (3.948) (2.194) 
(PCR) .119 .194*** 
(.623) (1.134) 
(PY) .565* -.341 
(3.386) (-.590) 
F-Ratio 7.lb 11.91b 8.15b 16.35b 
R-Square .684 .706 
* Significant at .05 level. 
** Significant at .10 level. 
*** Significant at .20 level. 
• Indirect effects are estimated as the difference between the reduced form and the second stage 
coefficients. 
b Significant at .0001 level. 
••• 
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Table 9 
Estimated Parameters of the Double Log Bank Branch Function 
Permanent Income Hypothesis 
Reduced Form 
Parameter Equation 
(Variable) (T-Ratio) 
Intercept -8.166* 
(11.06) 
(PYP) .568* 
(8.351) 
(PYT) .402 
(.381) 
(PY) 
(L) .038 
(.254) 
(P) -.17* 
(-2.254) 
(RDV) .063* 
(2.309) 
(PCR) .126* 
(1.617) 
(DINT/POP) 
F-Ratio 12.94b 
R-Square 
* Significant at .05 level. 
** Significant at .10 level. 
*** Significant at .20 level. 
Second Stage 
Statistics Indirect 
(T-Ratio) Effect• 
-7.893* 
(-12.762) 
.478* .09 
(3.096) 
-.155* -.015 
(-3.591) 
.022* .041 
(.294) 
.107* .019 
(1.487) 
.158** 
(1.624) 
26.~ 
.794 
Absolute Income Hypothesis 
Reduced Form Second Stage 
Equation Statistics 
(T-Ratio) (T-Ratio) 
-8.14* -7.577* 
(-11.762) (-10.959) 
.557* .415* 
(8.145) (1.864) 
.072 
(.483) 
-.171* -.173* 
(-2.936) (-4.208) 
.059* -.007* 
(2.178) (-.061) 
.119* .071*** 
(1.702) (.864) 
.252** 
(1.679) 
14.74b 29.1~ 
.811 
• Indirect effects are estimated as the difference between the reduced form and the second stage 
coefficients. 
b Significant at .0001 level. 
·.·-
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